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20.1  Introduction 
This study uses generational accounting, a new method of long-term fiscal 
planning, to derive the future net taxes that will balance Portugal’s government 
budget accounts. Specifically, it computes a set of generational accounts and 
uses them to reach an important conclusion: Portuguese fiscal policy is unsus- 
tainable. 
Current budgetary policy includes ceilings on the budget and the debt until 
the year 2000, which fulfill the convergence criteria set out in the Treaty on 
European Union for accession to the euro. Yet, under current fiscal rules, future 
Portuguese generations face a net tax (taxes paid net of transfer payments re- 
ceived) burden, relative to income, that is well in excess of that faced by current 
generations. Significant increases in taxes or reductions in expenditures are 
required to  satisfy the government’s long-term (intertemporal) budget con- 
straint and avoid unfairly burdening future generations. 
Generational accounting offers an intuitive measure of the sustainability of 
fiscal policy, namely, generational balance-the  condition that future genera- 
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tions pay the same share of their lifetime labor income in net taxes (taxes paid 
net of transfer payments received) as is paid by current generations. In addition 
to showing the substantial current imbalance in Portuguese generational policy, 
alternative means of achieving generational balance are suggested in this study. 
Because it is forward loolung and deals explicitly with implicit as well as 
explicit liabilities, generational accounting can provide more insight into a na- 
tion’s fiscal affairs than can the simple consideration of its official budget defi- 
cit. Generational accounting is particularly helpful in understanding the pros- 
pects for national economies,  such as the Portuguese, undergoing profound 
change in their fiscal and monetary regimes. Section 20.2 describes recent Por- 
tuguese  economic reforms, traces out their implications, and  suggests  addi- 
tional measures needed for Portugal to attract foreign investment and to con- 
verge to European  levels of income. The size of  the  net  tax burden  facing 
future generations is documented by  section 20.3’s generational  accounting 
and the alternative means of facing it are contrasted. As stated in the conclu- 
sion, section 20.4, Portugal’s generational accounts provide a way for interna- 
tional investors to judge whether fiscal stability is actually being achieved by 
the Portuguese government. 
20.2  Regime Change and Fiscal Evolution 
European economic integration influenced Portugal for decades, even when 
restricted civil rights and the absence of political parties hindered mutual polit- 
ical responsiveness with the member states of  the Common Market. Export- 
led growth of  the  1960s, associated with membership in the European Free 
Trade Association,  changed  much  of  Portuguese  industry. Agriculture  and 
finance,  however, remained  traditional. Large-scale  industrial projects  were 
directed  toward  fostering  economic  integration  with  the  African  colonies, 
whereas trade and emigration were overwhelmingly  directed toward Europe. 
Following decades of conservative social and economic policies, a bloodless 
military coup (the “carnation revolution”) in April 1974 paved the way for a 
radical swing to the left, with widespread nationalizations and the adoption of 
many philosophical and institutional tenets of central planning. 
Under pressure from military leaders, the two newly created major political 
parties,  the left-of-center  Partido  Socialista (PS) and right-of-center  Partido 
Social Democrata (PSD), approved a constitution in 1976 that included an ex- 
plicit prohibition of privatization. With traditional agriculture in the hands of 
cooperatives and  a  state-owned financial  system (which  incorporated  most 
large-scale  industrial projects),  the  only  sizable  firms remaining  in  private 
hands were in export-oriented manufacturing. 
‘The main constraint on inflationary policies came from the balance of pay- 
ments and led to attempts to restore external balance via exchange rate depreci- 
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Table 20.1  Convergence Indicators 
Growth Rate  Nominal  Long-Term  Real  Deficit 
of Labor  Real Wage  Nominal  Exchange  (% of 





























































"Portugal vs. EU average as presented in Braga de Macedo (1997). 
in private economic activity. Market-oriented policies for internal balance did 
not begin to regain prominence until EU accession in 1986. 
Under the leadership of  Cavaco Silva the PSD obtained a majority in two 
successive general elections in July 1987 and in October 1991. Between 1985 
and  1995, the PSD rule achieved a stable democratic government and rapid 
convergence toward European levels of most economic and social indicators. 
Indeed, Portugal now appears to be a serious contender for inclusion in the 
initial group of  countries to join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
and adopt the euro as a single currency. 
20.2.1  The Change in Economic Regime 
In order to reduce the public sector of  the Portuguese economy, a consti- 
tutional amendment allowing privatization was  necessary. This amendment 
required a two-thirds majority and, thus, had to be supported by both the PS 
and PSD parties. This bipartisan support was achieved in the summer of  1989. 
Table 20.1  reports indicators of  real and nominal convergence between Por- 
tugal and the average of its EU partners. The indicators are the rate of labor 
productivity growth, the rate of nominal wage growth, and long-term nominal 
interest rates according to the European Commission forecasts of winter 1996. 
The real effective exchange rate relative to the Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD) average (up is depreciation) and the gen- 
eral government deficit as a percentage of GDP are also reported in table 20.1. 
The decade from 1974 to 1985 had been a period of  severe economic dis- 
equilibrium, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) twice being called 
to intervene with standby arrangements. The fiscal deficit averaged close to 10 
percent of GDP during this period, and inflation rates reached nearly 30 per- 
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age duration around one year, which is one-fourth of  the normal parliamen- 
tary term. 
Recognizing that convergence toward the price stability and living standards 
of  the European Community required a multiyear program, the government 
prepared  the  Program  to  Correct External  Imbalances and  Unemployment 
(PCEDED), or PI, which was approved in March  1987. Thanks to the inter- 
national boom, and the terms-of-trade improvement, real convergence was ac- 
companied by  the elimination of the payments deficits and by  sustained job 
creation. 
The inflation differential relative to the Community average initially fell but 
later rose again and the debt-to-GDP ratio peaked at approximately 75 percent 
in 1988. In July 1989, following the acceptance of the EMU at the European 
Council in Madrid, the government approved a revised version of the PCEDED 
called  P2. Under this revised program, fiscal adjustment  was based on the 
newly reformed tax system, which introduced comprehensive income taxation 
for the first time. The concomitant revenue increases led the official govern- 
ment deficit to fall below 3 percent of GDP in 1989 (table 20.1). 
The multiyear fiscal adjustment strategy contained in P2 was gradual, and 
before the change of the constitution, the size of  the public sector remained 
essentially constant until 1990. Moreover, the rekindling of inflation led to an 
equally gradual abandonment of the policy of expected depreciation (crawling 
peg), which had been in place since 1977. While this mechanism was replaced 
in the spring of  1990 with shadowing the European Community’s Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM), the change was never announced publicly. Moreover, 
controls on capital inflows were introduced on top of the traditional restrictions 
on outflows. Because it was not based on clear rules, this shadow exchange 
arrangement managed by the central bank turned out to be more opaque and 
rigid than ERM membership. Because it preceded inflation convergence, it also 
brought greater volatility to the real exchange rate, as shown in table 20.1. 
In  1990 and 1991, the Portuguese economy grew at approximately  1 per- 
centage point above the Community average, while the inflation differential 
fell from 8 to 7 points. However, the official budget deficit deteriorated to al- 
most 7 percent of GDP, and a reform of public sector pay led to wage increases 
that were 12 percentage points greater than the EU average. Exchange controls, 
in turn, increased rates on public bonds to 8 percentage points above the EU 
average. This was inconsistent with the exchange rate regime change implicit 
in the National Adjustment  Framework for the Transition to Economic and 
Monetary Union, known as QUANTUM (or Ql), approved in June 1990. 
The second PSD government, elected at the end of  1991, made the strategy 
of  full participation in EMU a central part of  its economic program.’ In the 
convergence program for 1992-95 approved by the European Council (Ecofin) 
1. The relevant national and European Community documents are summarized and interpreted 
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in December, and dubbed 42, fiscal, structural, and income policies were set 
in a macroeconomic framework consistent with a single European currency to 
which the escudo would be credibly pegged. Central features of the program 
were the inflation objective and the principle of nonaccommodation of nominal 
budgetary expenditures to any slippage in the inflation outcome. The budget 
process started with an overall expenditure ceiling in nominal terms, which 
was mandatory for the central government and recommended for the general 
government. To avoid higher other spending after the expected fall in interest 
rates, these ceilings were expressed net of interest payments on government 
debt. The next stage was the determination of  the corresponding sources of 
revenue and financing. Finally, decisions were made regarding the allocation of 
the general government budget and, more specifically, of the central govem- 
ment budget. 
Moderation in public sector wage increases was fundamental to compliance 
with the expenditure ceiling. As  a participant in the process determining in- 
come policy, the government proposed target ranges for inflation consistent 
with convergence to the EU best performers. The average inflation range envis- 
aged in 42  was 7 to 9 percent in 1992 and 4 to 6 percent in the period 1993-95. 
At the same time, strict restraint on increases in other general government ex- 
penditures was essential to permit a significant increase in public investment 
in real terms, which was desirable to ease the catching-up process. 
Monetary policy was kept compatible with the shadow exchange rate regime 
until the entry of the escudo in the ERM in April 1992, opening the way  for 
the removal of the controls on capital inflows that had been introduced in 1991 
and full liberalization of capital movements in December 1992. 
Budgetary and structural policies were also important features of  42. One 
goal was the reduction of the public sector deficit. In line with the projected 
macroeconomic framework, the general government deficit was to decline to 3 
percent of  GDP and the debt-to-GDP ratio to 53 percent on average for the 
three-year period 1993-95. With the anticipated reduction in interest rates, the 
interest burden was expected to fall from 9 percent of GDP in 1991-92  to 5 
percent on average in 1993-95. The 1992 budget placed an overall ceiling on 
total noninterest expenditures, requiring stable noninvestment spending but 
allowing increasing public capital expenditures. A major revision of indirect 
taxation-mainly  changes in the value-added tax (VAT) base and rates-was 
responsible for increasing revenue, while the speeding up of privatization al- 
lowed the repayment of public debt. 
The outcome for 1992 was in line with the program, and the general govern- 
ment deficit declined to 3.6 percent, from 6.7 percent in 1991. Public debt fell 
from 69.3 to 61.4 percent of GDP, while inflation declined from 11.4 to 8.9 
percent. Output growth, however, continued to slow, and GDP growth fell to 
1.7 percent in 1992, from 2.3 percent in 1991. Monetary policy continued to 
be very cautious and real interest rates remained very high (by the end of 1992, 
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The economic downturn continued in  1993, with serious consequences for 
the fiscal position. The nominal expenditure ceiling for the central government 
was  adhered  to,  despite higher  unemployment  benefits,  but  revenues  fell 
sharply, reflecting a weakening of tax collection in a more difficult economic 
climate and as a consequence of the abolition of customs within the European 
Union. The general government deficit doubled to about 7 percent of GDP and 
public debt rose to 66.6 percent, instead of declining as anticipated. The only 
economic variable that improved as planned was inflation, declining to 6.5 
percent. Real GDP fell by  1.2 percent. A revised convergence program was 
presented with the 1994 budget and approved by the Monetary Committee on 
30 November 1993, when the budget itself was approved in Parliament. The 
revised program extended the expenditure ceilings into 1997 when it was re- 
placed  by  the Convergence  Stability  and  Growth  Program  (CSGP),  which 
brought the fiscal adjustment path forward until the year 2000. 
Economic policy in 1994 and 1995 was geared toward gradually recovering 
the growth and convergence path. The overall deficit was reduced to 5.8 per- 
cent in 1994 and 5.1 percent in 1995, with the bulk of the improvement coming 
from reduced interest payments. The public debt service declined from 6.6 
percent of GDP in 1993 to 5.6 percent in 1995, despite a continued increase in 
the stock of public debt (71.5 percent of  GDP in 1995, up from 66.6 percent 
in  1993). The implicit interest rate on public debt fell from  10.6 percent in 
1993 to 8.1 percent  in  1995, to an estimated 7.6 percent in  1996. Inflation 
continued to decline, to 4 percent in 1995, and output growth recovered mod- 
estly, to 1 percent in 1994 and 2.8 percent in 1995. Economic recovery contin- 
ued with ever greater vigor in  1996 and in  1997, helping  considerably the 
attainment of the debt-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP targets required for partici- 
pation in the EMU. 
The data on relative productivity reported in table 20.1 suggest a double-dip 
recession, in 1991 and 1994, when productivity growth in Portugal was 2 per- 
cent below the EU average. In 1991 this was mostly due to high employment 
growth, whereas in 1994 it was a consequence of a delayed recovery from the 
1993 trough. This pattern may  explain why the perception of  the change in 
regime was delayed until the end of the recession. It is also consistent with the 
observed slowdown of structural reforms. 
20.2.2  Structural Reforms 
Since the mid-l980s, the evolution of the public finances has been deter- 
mined by several major structural reforms. In 1986, a VAT was introduced and 
subsequently has been harmonized  with EU levels. Comprehensive income 
taxation was introduced in  1989. In  1993, tax exemptions were rationalized 
and a reform of tax administration initiated; the reform was further consoli- 
dated in 1994 and 1995. This involved successive tax amnesty plans, especially 
for firms and for the self-employed. The method has continued to be used by 
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to sort out the effects of amnesty and improved tax collection from the general 
improvement in profitability and consumer confidence stemming from the re- 
covery in economic activity. 
The privatization law  opened the way  for a large-scale privatization pro- 
gram, with the bulk of the proceeds allocated to the reduction of public debt. 
Until 1993, a mandatory 80 percent of privatization receipts was used for debt 
reduction; thereafter, at least 40 percent had to be used for that purpose, with 
the remainder used to provide capital for the restructuring of public enterprises. 
Between  1989 and  1995, Portugal’s privatization program raised an amount 
equivalent to about 10 percent of GDP, which made Portugal the OECD’s third 
largest privatizer after the United Kingdom and New Zealand. The state’s pres- 
ence in the economy (particularly the financial sector) was reduced from about 
20 percent of value added in 1989 to 10 percent in 1994, and from 6.5 percent 
of  employment to 3 percent. Major privatizations in  1994 included banking 
and cement enterprises, and in  1995 the privatization of  the telecommunica- 
tions sector was initiated. The process continued with the PS government and 
has benefited from the recovery in economic activity. 
Debt  management policy  led  to a shift from central bank borrowing to 
market-based domestic and foreign borrowing and the introduction of  long- 
term fixed rate instruments. In the late  1980s, central bank policy came to 
depend increasingly on issuing short-term domestic debt to compensate for the 
growing capital inflows attracted not only by the favorable investment climate 
but also, increasingly, by  the highly  remunerative real  interest rates to be 
earned on pure arbitrage operations. In spite of  strict controls on capital in- 
flows, the central bank’s foreign reserves more than doubled, from $10 billion 
in 1989 to $20.6 billion in 1991, with disastrous consequences for the bank’s 
operating results. The bank was effectively accumulating huge dollar deposits 
earning a 5 percent rate of return, while paying 20 percent on the escudo debt 
being issued to mop up the resultant “excess” liquidity. The cost of this policy, 
during the period 1990-92,  is estimated to have exceeded the structural funds 
received from the European Community in the same period. 
Following entry in the ERM, the currency became fully convertible for the 
first time since leaving the gold standard in 1891 (except for a short-lived at- 
tempt in  1931). As real interest rates declined, maturities were lengthened, 
with the issue of three-year, five-year, and eight-year government bonds (pre- 
viously, practically all borrowing was at three- and six-month maturities). Fur- 
ther downward pressure on domestic interest rates was  achieved by  shifting 
some of the government’s borrowing needs abroad. Benchmark issues in yen 
and deutsche mark in the first half of  1993 were followed by  an upgrade of 
Portugal’s rating to AA-  grade and the successful placement of a U.S. dollar 
global issue in September and a global ECU issue in early 1994. These oper- 
ations opened the way  for Portuguese enterprises to borrow directly abroad, 
ending the long-lasting protectionism enjoyed by the financial sector. In mid- 
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sovereign entity to borrow abroad without state guarantees. One year later, the 
approval of  the CSGP by Ecofin was widely  seen as the culmination of the 
medium-term-oriented macroeconomic policy initiated six years earlier. 
Despite the achievements of the past decade, several areas require further at- 
tention. There is general consensus that the justice, education, and health de- 
livery  systems benefited  from  significant  investment  in  expanding facilities 
during the past  10 years but  that the quantitative increase now needs  to be 
complemented by  improvements in quality and efficiency. However, public 
sector reform and social security reform are more germane to the fiscal dis- 
cussion. 
The government elected at the end of  1991 made some progress in restruc- 
turing the major spending ministries, but the double-dip recession, subsequent 
slow recovery, and rising unemployment have effectively removed public sec- 
tor reform from the political agenda. 
Within public sector reform, the most important item, in terms of financial 
magnitude and fiscal pressures, is social security.2  Portugal's growth in per cap- 
ita expenditure on social protection benefits during 1985-95  was the highest 
in the European Union, albeit from relatively low initial levels. The social se- 
curity system provides pensions and a wide range of welfare benefits, mostly 
on a universal basis. Funding is from payroll contributions and residually by 
the state. The contribution rate (almost 40 percent, including compulsory acci- 
dent insurance) is one of the highest in the European Union and amounts to a 
very significant tax on labor utilization, contributing to unemployment. 
With an aging population and real increases in benefits reflecting real wage 
increases of the past decade, the financial imbalance will continue to grow. The 
dependency ratio is projected to peak at 44 percent in 2045, from 37 percent 
in 1995 (table 20.2). The residual financing from the state budget will continue 
to increase unless the system is reformed. Additionally, civil servant pensions 
cost 3 percent of  GDP in  1995 and are projected to increase further. Unless 
significant reform is undertaken soon, the social security financial imbalance 
promises to be the major economic problem facing future generations. 
20.3  Portuguese Generational Accounts 
The generational accounts technique requires a choice of base year, in this 
case 1995, and future population projections and an accounting of fiscal aggre- 
gates for the base year. Using incidence profiles, all taxes and transfers in the 
base year are distributed across existing generations, obtaining per capita mea- 
sures of taxes and transfers for each cohort, broken down by age (from 0 to 90 
years) and sex. Generational accounts for existing generations are then calcu- 
lated by projecting these tax and transfer profiles forward based on an assumed 
2. See Kotlikoff (1996).  Braga de Macedo's introduction to United Nations (1997) has a discus- 
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Table 20.2  Dependency Ratios, 1995-2070 
Year  Elderly  Children  Total 
1995  0.15  0.22  0.37 
2000  0.16  0.21  0.36 
2005  0.16  0.20  0.36 
2010  0.16  0.20  0.37 
2015  0.17  0.20  0.37 
2020  0.18  0.20  0.38 
2025  0.19  0.20  0.39 
2030  0.20  0.20  0.40 
2035  0.2  1  0.20  0.41 
2040  0.23  0.21  0.43 
2045  0.24  0.21  0.44 
2050  0.23  0.21  0.44 
2055  0.22  0.21  0.43 
2060  0.20  0.22  0.42 
2065  0.20  0.22  0.41 
2070  0.19  0.22  0.41 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on population data of the World Bank 
rate of  productivity growth and discounting back to the present with an  as- 
sumed discount rate. Generational accounts for future generations are obtained 
as a residual, equal to the sum of existing government net debt and the present 
value of  future government purchases, less the generational accounts of  all 
existing generations. 
20.3.1  Data and Basic Assumptions 
Our population data come from the World Bank.3  Table 20.2 shows the pro- 
jections of the dependency ratios, expressed as the ratio of children (younger 
than age 18) and the elderly (those older than age 64)  to the working-age popu- 
lation (1  8 to 64 years). As is true in most other developed countries, the elderly 
dependency ratio is projected to grow during the coming decades, increasing 
by more than half over the next 50 years. 
Fiscal data come primarily from the OECD general government accounts. 
In  1995, direct taxes amounted to 1,469.0  billion escudos. They were distrib- 
uted across workers according to wages earned, based on a profile of  wage 
earnings estimated from the household survey InquCrito ao PatrimGnio e En- 
dividamento das Familias de 1994. (This survey was also used to estimate pro- 
files for consumption, self-employment plus property income, and receipt of 
transfer  payment^.)^ 
This assignment of all income taxes, including corporate income taxes, to 
3. We thank Eduard Bos for making his projections available. 
4. We are grateful to Pedro Neves of Banco de Portugal for providing his data. Carlos Andrade 
of the Catholic University of  Portugal also did some of the initial data work. 480  A. Auerbach, J. Braga de Macedo, J. Braz, L. Kotlikoff, J. Walker 
labor reflects our assumption that as a small open economy, Portugal cannot 
impose a burden on internationally mobile capital. Because they are imposed 
as employment taxes, social security contributions of  1,783.4 billion escudos 
were also distributed according to the wage profile. Indirect taxes of 2,207.6 
billion escudos, generally taxes on consumption, were distributed according to 
a consumption profile. Property and entrepreneurial taxes of  354.5 billion es- 
cudos were distributed according to a combined self-employment plus prop- 
erty profile. 
On the transfer side, the only breakdown is between social security and other 
transfers. These two categories, a total of 2,516.8 billion escudos, are lumped 
together and distributed according to a profile of general transfer receipts. 
Government spending is the sum of government consumption (2,730.9 bil- 
lion escudos), subsidies (136.6 billion escudos), and government net invest- 
ment (437.2 billion escudos) minus transfers received, primarily from the Eu- 
ropean  Union  (121.9 billion  escudos). The  resulting  total  of  government 
purchases is 3,182.8 billion escudos. By  our measures, the resulting govern- 
ment primary surplus (taxes less transfers and government purchases) in  1995 
was  114.9 billion escudos. The government net financial debt (obtained from 
Portugal’s own fiscal accounts) is 10,724.9 billion escudos. 
As an alternative to treating government expenditures on education as a gov- 
ernment purchase, as done in the base case, we  treat these expenditures as 
transfer payments, allocated across ~ohorts.~ 
To maintain comparability with the estimates for the other countries in this 
project, all generational accounts are converted into U.S. dollars, using the 
exchange rate of 0.006104 dollars per escudo. 
For future years, the profiles for taxes, transfers, and educational expendi- 
tures remain fixed, except for productivity growth. This means that shifts in 
the composition of  the population will exert an impact on the GDP shares of 
each of  these items, as cohorts vary in their intensity of  tax payments and 
receipt of transfers and educational expenditures. We  assume that government 
purchases other than education grow with productivity and contrast the case in 
which education is a government purchase with the one in which the benefits 
are directed toward the younger generations, thus lowering their net lifetime 
taxes relative to what they would otherwise be. 
20.3.2  Generational Accounts 
Table 20.3A presents the base-case generational accounts for males and fe- 
males combined, using a discount rate of 5 percent and a productivity growth 
rate of  1.5 percent and treating government educational expenditures as gov- 
ernment purchases (i.e., not allocated to individual generations). For cohorts at 
5. The data, based on unpublished Portuguese government data on expenditures by educational 
level, were provided by  Jose Manuel Bracinha Vieira, former education secretary, to whom we 
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Table 20.3A  Generational Accounts for Males and Females Combined: Base Case 
(thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Property  Social 
Generation’s  Net  Income  and  Insurance  Indirect  Trans-  Edu- 
































































































36.4  17.9  0.0 
37.  I  21.1  0.0 
37.6  24.7  0.0 
37.9  29.0  0.0 
37.9  33.9  0.0 
37.6  39.3  0.0 
36.2  45.0  0.0 
33.8  50.7  0.0 
30.5  56.8  0.0 
26.7  63.9  0.0 
22.2  70.6  0.0 
17.7  75.4  0.0 
13.7  74.6  0.0 
10.5  67.6  0.0 
8.0  54.9  0.0 
5.9  41.2  0.0 
4.0  29.3  0.0 
2.5  18.1  0.0 
0.6  4.8  0.0 
Future 
Percentage 
generations  91.8 
difference  48.7 
five-year intervals between ages 0 and 90, the table shows the total generational 
account (the net present value fiscal burden over that generation’s remaining 
lifetime) as well as the tax and transfer components of  that generational ac- 
count. According to the table, a representative newborn in 1995 faces a genera- 
tional account of $61,800, the difference between taxes of $79,700 and trans- 
fers of $17,900. Following the typical pattern, the accounts increase initially 
with age, as generations move closer to the primary taxpaying years, and then 
decline, as the retirement years of lower taxes and higher receipt of  transfer 
payments approach. The highest value of the account, $86,000, occurs at age 
20, with the accounts turning negative after age 45. 
Under current policy, a representative member of  future generations will 
have  to pay  $91,800 adjusted for productivity growth, or 48.7 percent more 
than current newborns, who are assumed to pay taxes and receive transfer pay- 
ments according to current fiscal rules. 
Table 20.3B presents the generational accounts for current and future gener- 
ations allocating educational spending to  individuals. Because educational 
spending is heavily concentrated among the young, the net payment of Portu- 482  A. Auerbach, J. Braga de Macedo, J. Braz, L. Kotlikoff, J. Walliser 
Table 20.3B  Generational Accounts for Males and Females Combined: Base Case, 
Education Treated as Transfer Payments (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Property  Social 
Generation’s  Net  Income  and  Insurance  Indirect  Trans-  Edu- 
























43.5  17.8 
45.5  21.0 
50.9  24.8 
65.3  29.1 
82.7  33.7 
84.5  35.5 
75.0  33.9 
60.0  30.9 
39.7  26.3 
15.9  20.9 
-10.6  14.6 
-33.9  8.9 
-47.1  5.0 
-49.4  2.7 
-42.7  1.4 
-33.3  0.6 
-24.8  0.0 
-  15.4  0.0 









































36.4  17.9  18.2 
37.1  21.1  21.6 
37.6  24.7  22.0 
37.9  29.0  14.3 
37.9  33.9  3.3 
37.6  39.3  0.6 
36.2  45.0  0.0 
33.8  50.7  0.0 
30.5  56.8  0.0 
26.7  63.9  0.0 
22.2  70.6  0.0 
17.7  75.4  0.0 
13.7  74.6  0.0 
10.5  67.6  0.0 
8.0  54.9  0.0 
5.9  41.2  0.0 
4.0  29.3  0.0 
2.5  18.1  0.0 
0.6  4.8  0.0 
guese aged 25 or younger is smaller once educational spending is accounted 
for. The net payment of Portuguese newborns is thus $18,200 smaller in table 
20.3B than  in table 20.3A. Allocating education to individuals also changes 
the percentage difference between the payments of current and future genera- 
tions. As table 20.3B shows, future generations face a 68.3 percent higher bur- 
den than current generations under that calculation. 
Tables 20.4 (males) and 20.5 (females) break down the generational account 
in table 20.3A by sex, based on the assumption of equal percentage imbalances 
by sex between  current and future newborns. A comparison  of  these tables 
shows that males face higher generational accounts because of their higher tax 
payments, due to higher labor market earnings, and their lower receipt of trans- 
fer payments, attributable primarily to their lower life expectancy. 
Table 20.6A presents alternative estimates, for males and females combined, 
for three different discount rates (3, 5, and 7 percent) and three different rates 
of productivity growth (1, 1.5, and 2 percent), a total of nine combinations that 
span a broad range of possible values. Our base-case results from table 20.3A, 
for an interest rate,  r, of  5 percent and a productivity growth rate, g, of  1.5 
percent, are presented in boldface, in the center column of the table. Table 20.4A  Generational  Accounts for Males: Base Case (thousands of US.  dollars) 
~ 
Property  Social 
Generation’s  Net  Income  and  Insurance  Indirect  Trans-  Edu- 



































































































36.6  18.6 
37.7  22.0 
38.6  25.8 
39.4  30.2 
39.9  35.6 
40.0  41.9 
39.1  48.6 
37.2  55.4 
34.2  63.0 
30.3  71.5 
25.5  79.9 
20.3  85.8 
15.7  85.9 
12.0  78.5 
9.0  63.4 
6.5  47.3 
4.4  34.3 
2.6  21.9 




















Table 20.4B  Generational  Accounts for Males: Base Case, Education Treated as  Transfer 
Payments (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Property  Social 
Generation’s  Net  Income  and  Insurance  Indirect  Trans-  Edu- 






















52.9  21.5 
57.1  25.5 
64.8  30.0 
81.9  35.3 
102.6  41.2 
106.6  43.8 
98.5  42.9 
83.1  39.9 
60.6  34.9 
32.4  28.4 
0.4  20.7 
-29.9  13.0 
-49.1  7.4 
-53.3  3.7 
-48.2  1.9 
-37.9  0.8 
-29.1  0.0 
-  18.8  0.0 







































36.6  18.6  18.2 
37.7  22.0  21.6 
38.6  25.8  22.0 
39.4  30.2  14.3 
39.9  35.6  3.3 
40.0  41.9  0.6 
39.1  48.6  0.0 
37.2  55.4  0.0 
34.2  63.0  0.0 
30.3  71.5  0.0 
25.5  79.9  0.0 
20.3  85.8  0.0 
15.7  85.9  0.0 
12.0  78.5  0.0 
9.0  63.4  0.0 
6.5  47.3  0.0 
4.4  34.3  0.0 
2.6  21.9  0.0 
0.7  6.3  0.0 
88.9 Table 20.5A  Generational Accounts for Females: Base Case (thousands  of U.S. dollars) 
Property  Social 
Generation's  Net  Income  and  Insurance  Indirect  Trans-  Edu- 






















51.8  13.9 
55.1  16.4 
58.5  19.3 
62.3  22.7 
65.5  26.1 
62.5  26.9 
51.7  25.0 
37.4  22.2 
20.0  18.2 
0.0  13.7 
-20.6  9.1 
-37.5  5.3 
-45.4  2.9 
-44.5  I .8 
-38.5  1  .o 
-  30.0  0.5 
-22.2  0.0 
-  13.8  0.0 








































36.1  17.1  0.0 
36.4  20.2  0.0 
36.5  23.6  0.0 
36.3  27.7  0.0 
35.9  32.2  0.0 
35.1  36.7  0.0 
33.3  41.4  0.0 
30.4  46.1  0.0 
27.0  51.0  0.0 
23.3  56.7  0.0 
19.2  62.3  0.0 
15.3  66.1  0.0 
12.0  64.9  0.0 
9.3  58.5  0.0 
7.2  48.4  0.0 
5.4  36.9  0.0 
3.8  26.2  0.0 
2.4  16.3  0.0 
0.6  4.2  0.0 
Table 20.5B  Generational Accounts for Females: Base Case, Education Treated as 
Transfer Payments (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Property  Social 
Generation's  Net  Income  and  Insurance  Indirect  Trans-  Edu- 





































-  30.0 
-22.2 




























































36.1  17.1 
36.4  20.2 
36.5  23.6 
36.3  27.7 
35.9  32.2 
35.1  36.7 
33.3  41.4 
30.4  46.1 
27.0  51.0 
23.3  56.7 
19.2  62.3 
15.3  66.1 
12.0  64.9 
9.3  58.5 
7.2  48.4 
5.4  36.9 
3.8  26.2 
2.4  16.3 



















0.0 Table 20.6A  Sensitivity Analysis (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
g=1  g = 1.5  g=2 
r=3  r=5  r=7  r=3  r=5  r=7  r=3  r=5  r=7 
Net payment of newborns  86.9  54.8  35.5  97.2  61.8  39.6  107.9  69.6  44.3 
Net payment of future generations  116.9  85.4  69.9  127.6  91.8  72.7  138.5  99.4  69.5 
Difference in net payments 
A  b  s  o  1  u  t  e  30.0  30.5  34.5  30.3  30.1  33.1  30.6  29.8  25.2 
Percentage  34.5  55.7  97.2  31.2  48.7  83.7  28.4  42.8  56.9 
Nore; g is productivity growth rate (percent); r is discount rate (percent). 
Table 20.6B  Sensitivity  Analysis: Education Treated as Transfer Payments (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
g=l  g = 1.5  g=2 
r=3  r=5  r=7  r=3  r=5  r=7  r=3  r=5  r=7 
Net payment of newborns  64.5  37.9  22.4  73.1  43.5  25.6  82.0  50.0  29.4 
Net payment of future generations  93.9  68.0  56.7  102.7  73.2  58.5  111.8  79.4  61.0 
Difference in net payments 
A  b  s  o  1  u  t  e  29.4  30.2  34.2  29.7  29.7  32.8  29.8  29.4  31.6 
Percentage  45.6  79.7  152.7  40.6  68.2  128.0  36.4  58.8  107.7 
Nore: g is productivity growth rate (percent); r is discount rate (percent). 486  A. Auerbach, J. Braga de Macedo, J. Braz, L. Kotlikoff, J. Walliser 
For both current and future generations, the generational accounts fall with 
an increase in the interest rate and rise with an increase in the growth rate. 
Each of these phenomena is easily understood. For a newborn generation, a 
generational account equals the present value of future taxes less future trans- 
fers. Discounting these future flows more heavily (with a higher value of  r) 
acts to decrease the present value of both taxes and transfers and hence their 
difference, the generational account, as well. In principle, there is an offsetting 
impact,  in that  transfers, which typically  occur later in  life, should be dis- 
counted even more heavily. However, because transfers are relatively  small 
compared to taxes in the Portuguese case, this effect is not strong enough to 
offset the former effect. 
For a given discount rate, a higher rate of productivity growth means higher 
taxes and transfers in the future and, following the same logic as above, has two 
effects. The first is to raise the value of both taxes and transfers. The second is 
to raise the present value of transfers, which occur later in life, more. Again, 
because transfers are relatively  small, the first effect dominates,  and higher 
growth leads to a higher net tax payment  in present value (generational ac- 
count). In terms of the generational imbalance, the percentage gap between 
current and future generations rises with the interest rate  and falls with the 
growth rate. 
While the accounts may appear sensitive to these changes in r and g, note 
that the important calculation-the  imbalance between current and future gen- 
erations-is  quite robust. The absolute difference between current and future 
newborns ranges only between $25,200 and $34,500, both values quite close 
to our base-case estimate of $30,100; and while the percentage  differences 
vary more, all estimates indicate a substantial percentage difference between 
current and future generations. 
As  seen  in  tables  20.4B,  20.5B,  and  20.6B, which  correspond  to tables 
20.4A, 20.5A, and 20.6A for the base-case assumption for educational spend- 
ing, allocating educational spending to individuals lowers the generational ac- 
counts of young and newborn current generations, who are the beneficiaries of 
educational spending. As shown in table 20.6B this alternative assumption has 
essentially no impact on the difference between the generational accounts of 
current newborns and future generations, which, implicitly in the calculation, 
also are being credited with the benefits of educational spending. 
20.3.3  Understanding Portugal’s Generational Imbalance 
Given the small reported primary surplus in the base year, it may seem sur- 
prising that future generations face such steep tax increases. However, there 
are two straightforward explanations for this finding, one relating to the past, 
the other to the future. 
The first explanation is that, as discussed above, past fiscal policy has accu- 
mulated a large financial debt, the burden of which remains. Were the current 
stock of financial debt zero. this would eliminate about two-thirds of the ex- 487  Generational Accounting in Portugal 
isting imbalance between current and future generations-from  48.7 percent 
to 16.2 percent. 
Even zero debt and a current primary surplus leaves some imbalance be- 
cause the changing demographic composition of  the country is leading to an 
older population that will receive more transfers and pay  less taxes. As dis- 
cussed above, the dependency ratio is expected to increase sharply over the 
coming decades. Were the population age structure to remain constant, instead 
of undergoing this shift, current policy would be much closer to balance, even 
with the existing stock of debt-just  17.5 percent, just over a third of its cur- 
rent estimated level. 
Given the existing stock of debt and the changing structure of the popula- 
tion, though, the imbalance is large, requiring net taxes to increase nearly by 
half if no policy changes are enacted that affect current generations. However, 
policy changes enacted immediately would require less draconian measures, 
for they would be spread over a larger population that includes those pres- 
ently alive. 
20.3.4  Achieving Generational Balance 
We estimate that policy could be made sustainable-the  difference between 
the generational accounts of current and future newborns eliminated-through 
any of the following immediate and permanent policy changes (or some com- 
bination of them): 
7.6 percent reduction in government purchases (including education), 
9.8 percent reduction in government purchases (excluding education), 
9.6 percent reduction in all transfer payments, 
4.2 percent increase in all taxes, or 
13.3 percent increase in direct income taxes. 
Although each change would eliminate the generational imbalance, the poli- 
cies vary in the extent to which the burden would be borne by different genera- 
tions. For example, a reduction in transfer payments would place a larger bur- 
den on the current elderly, while an  increase in income taxes would have a 
much smaller impact on them and burden the young more. 
20.4  Conclusions 
Portugal has made significant changes in its monetary and fiscal policies 
over the past decade. Its current macroeconomic policies, directed toward in- 
clusion in the new European Economic and Monetary Union, are now  sup- 
ported by  the two major political parties. These facts notwithstanding, our 
findings suggest that Portugal remains far from achieving a truly sustainable 
fiscal policy, specifically, one that entails generational balance. Under our base- 
line assumptions future generations face a roughly 50 percent higher fiscal 
burden than do current newborns. This imbalance reflects Portugal’s past debt 488  A. Auerbach, J. Braga de Macedo, J. Braz, L. Kotlikoff, J. Walliser 
accumulation and the aging of  its population. A variety of  alternative tax in- 
crease and expenditure reduction policies can be used to achieve generational 
balance. Which of those policies spreads the burden most appropriately among 
old and young current generations is a matter for political debate. 
Achieving generational balance in Portuguese fiscal policy would not only 
improve economic prospects for future Portuguese citizens. It would also indi- 
cate to foreign investors that Portugal is not likely to expropriate their invest- 
ments in the future through extraordinary fiscal levies. While actually produc- 
ing generational balance in Portuguese fiscal policy may prove difficult, the 
longer the delay, the more painful will be the requisite fiscal adjustments. The 
generational accounts constructed here can help the Portuguese public to un- 
derstand the true cost of adjusting the tax and transfer system. 
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